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Doktor: Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment

FACIAL RECOGNITION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
WAKE OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
Matthew Doktor

I. INTRODUCTION
By the time you are finished reading this sentence over 20,000 images
were uploaded to social media—perhaps even an image of you.1 And by
the end of this sentence, algorithms can produce an index with images of
you and corresponding links.2 Private for-profit technology companies
leverage those images and social media posts, scraped from public and
private pages, to create databases searchable with facial recognition
software.3 While police have used facial recognition for roughly twenty
years, practical limitations restrained that technology.4 But with billions
of images from Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Instagram,
this technology can now reveal historic records of a person's movement
and associations.5 Despite the practical necessity of internet and social
media participation in modern society, research shows that Americans are
uncertain how to control that participation.6
For the past century, rapidly developing technology has challenged the
judiciary and legal scholars to adapt Fourth Amendment protections to
the modern world. Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence categorized
police use of technology as non-searches.7 But recently the United States
Supreme Court questioned that precedent in the face of novel surveillance
1. Rose Eveleth, How Many Photographs of You Are Out There in the World? ATLANTIC (Nov.
2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/how-many-photographs-of-you-areout-there-in-the-world/413389 [https://perma.cc/V89M-W7JF].
2. Anna Merlan, Here’s the File Clearview AI Has Keeping on Me, and Probably on You Too,
VICE (Feb. 28, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/5dmkyq/heres-the-file-clearview-aihas-been-keeping-on-me-and-probably-on-you-too [https://perma.cc/8XXA-XV9M].
3. Clearview AI founder describes itself as a new research tool for law enforcement. Kashmir
Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2020, 6:17
PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/7VSE-N26K].
4. Robinson Meyer, Who Owns Your Face?, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/how-good-facial-recognition-technologygovernment-regulation/397289 [https://perma.cc/J6YK-8NYW].
5. Kate Allen, Face Recognition App Used by Police, Until the Chief Found Out; Civil Liberty
Association Slams Use of Controversial Clearview AI Technology, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14, 2020., at A1.
6. Emily A. Vogels & Monica Anderson, Americans and Digital Knowledge, PEW RSCH. CTR.:
INTERNET, SCI. & TECH (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/10/09/americans-anddigital-knowledge/ (last visited Feb 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VEY9-34X2].
7. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding no search in a wiretap
of a telephone line absent physical trespass); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (finding no
search of a wired informant who transmitted a conversation to a nearby agent because of the permission
granted to the informant to enter the premises).
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technologies.8 Scholars also warn that this technology threatens privacy
rights.9
At its core, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reveals a reluctance to
develop bright-line rules for police technology, at the expense of
coherence and consistency. Instead the Court conceptualizes the Fourth
Amendment and police technology primarily through an amorphous
“reasonableness” standard.10 While the Court describes warrantless
searches as per se unreasonable and “subject to only a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions,” rapidly developing
surveillance technology often blurs these exceptions and forces the Court
into doctrinal contortions.11 In turn, the lower courts are left to wade
through inapposite doctrine to reconcile the factual contexts of each
individual case.12 Because of that precedent, some commentators argue
for First Amendment protections from facial recognition technology.13
Recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court extended Fourth
Amendment protections to third-party cell phone location data.14 The
Court grappled with the imprecise fit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and technology described as a “new phenomenon.”15 This Comment asks
whether Carpenter extends Fourth Amendment protections to facial
recognition searches of images mined from social media.
Part I of this Comment examines the development of modern law
enforcement technology in the age of social media and algorithms. Part II
traces the history of Fourth Amendment privacy rights and digital
surveillance leading to Carpenter. Finally, Part III argues for the
expansion of the decision’s underlying principles to emerging facial
recognition technology that leverages data derived from social media and
internet usage.16

8. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
9. See Steven Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 262 (2002) (“These
circumstances mean that efforts to revise privacy law to take account of the new technology will involve,
in different areas of human activity, the balancing of values in light of predictions about the technological
future.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 631 (2017) (“As new technologies develop in the Internet of Things and beyond, the hope is that
these informational security principles can be applied to keep the Fourth Amendment smart enough to
adapt to these challenges.”).
10. Cf. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
11. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
12. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
13. Alexander T. Nguyen, Here’s Looking At You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology
Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, at nn. 45-48 (2002).
14. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
15. Id. at 2216.
16. Hill, supra note 3.
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II. SURVEILLANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
On social media and the internet, privacy concerns quickly temper the
allure of connectivity and immediacy. Facial recognition technology
programmed on biometric data from images scraped from social media
images poses a significant privacy challenge when private companies
offer that technology to state actors. Ninety years after the Supreme Court
first addressed wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States, electronic
surveillance is a well-established fact of life.17 Because of this prevalence,
Congress passed legislation to regulate electronic surveillance in 1968.18
As society entered the digital and information ages, legislatures and
judiciaries attempted to delineate the legality of electronic surveillance.19
Early decisions rested on the foundation that the defendant "assumed the
risk" with the use of the technology, determining that a person voluntarily
conveying their information through internet-based platforms had no
expectation of privacy.20
In particular, federal courts have wrestled with government
surveillance and data collection issues from social media accounts as
early as 2011.21 While the courts are familiar with the Fourth Amendment
implications of electronic surveillance, facial recognition technology is a
novel issue with little authority addressing the constitutional issues with
its use.22 Like facial recognition, data scraping and social media
surveillance are comparatively recent developments that also threaten
privacy rights. Together, these technologies compound privacy concerns.

17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment search
in the wiretapping of a suspects phone in an investigation without a physical search of a person, home,
effects, or papers).
18. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 regulated the circumstances and
conditions in which oral and wire communications could be surveilled. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2519 (1968)).
19. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (2010) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in emails sent and stored on third-party services as analogous to a phone call or a letter, and that
compelled disclosure of internet service providers to surrender the contents of a subscriber's email address
under the Stored Communications Act is a Fourth Amendment search requiring compliance with the
warrant requirement).
20. See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.2d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).
21. See In re Application of The United States of America For An Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2703(d)., 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 131 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
I.P. address information conveyed by users to Twitter when they "chose to use the internet to communicate
with the Twitter Service").
22. See United States v. Jackson, No. 19-CR-60262CJS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28200, at *32
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020).
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A. Web Scraping Social Media
Web scraping, as a general practice, refers to the extraction and
collection of internet content for archival, data analysis, information
aggregation, and network mapping purposes.23 As social media users and
user data grew, scraping that data from those users became increasingly
profitable due to the impressive volume of user data uploaded to those
platforms.24 Even more concerning, scraping can harvest data and images
from search results.25 Those search engine results are indexed through
express permissions granted to search engines by social media sites to
access user information.26 And data analytics firms are able to access
private Facebook user data through third-party applications contracts with
the site.27
Data analytics companies like HiQ represent an industry premised on
access to data from social media member profiles.28 While that data can
remain anonymous in the aggregate, some private entities harvest user
images for the sole purpose of identifying the people in social media
images.29 LinkedIn reported 90 million attempts to scrape data every day
from its 50 million users.30 According to Facebook, third parties have
scraped user data from most of its 2.2 billion profiles.31
As those industries demonstrate, social media is a cultural mainstay in
American society. In the context of the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court explained that social media and the “modern internet” are the most
powerful mechanisms for modern discourse, information, and
connection.32 Approximately seventy percent of all U.S. adults use
Facebook, while photo sharing platforms like Instagram and Snapchat are

23. Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping And The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, 24
B.U. J. SCI & TECH. L. 372, 374 (2018) (explaining that web scraping has proliferated under the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which was designed as an anti-hacking measure).
24. Thomas Lee, LinkedIn-HiQ Spat Raises Big Questions, S.F. CHRON., Jul. 9, 2017, at D1.
25. Jack Nicas, Facebook Says Russian Firms ‘Scraped’ Data, Some For Facial Recognition, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/technology/facebook-russian-scrapingdata.html [https://perma.cc/6CDC-SE3F].
26. HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2019).
27. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Social Media Sites Helped Police Track Minorities,
ACLU Says, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 12, 2016, at 16.
28. Louise Matsakis, Scraping The Web Is A Powerful Tool. Clearview AI Abused It., WIRED (Jan.
25, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-ai-scraping-web/ [https://perma.cc/HT6Q-T6T9].
29. Matt O’Brien, Facebook, YouTube: Firm Must Stop Scraping Faces From Sites, NBC BAY
AREA (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/facebook-youtube-firm-must-stopscraping-faces-from-sites/2228373/ [https://perma.cc/59WN-DUFR].
30. HiQ Labs, Inc., 938 F.3d at 991.
31. Barbara Ortutay, Facebook: Most Users May Have Had Public Data ‘Scraped’, AP NEWS
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://apnews.com/4c5ee5ee573846b68e13e6c3a77b01bf/Facebook:-Most-users-mayhave-had-public-data-'scraped' [https://perma.cc/23VC-VHSF].
32. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017).
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increasingly popular with teens and young adults.33 Research shows that
Americans know their online activity is tracked, and sixty percent of
Americans consider it impossible to go through daily life without having
the government collect data about them.34
B. Facial Recognition of Biometric Features
While facial recognition technology dates back to the 1960s, modern
artificial neural networks coupled with social media images accelerated
the development of the algorithms that comprise facial recognition
technology.35 At its core, a facial recognition tool determines whether an
image contains a face, individual attributes, or a specific individual by
comparing the biometric data in the image to existing photographs stored
in a database.36
Biometric data is the foundation of facial recognition technology. In its
most basic form, biometrics refers to automated recognition of individuals
based on biological characteristics—a face, iris, fingerprint, or voice.37
Due to the permanence and personal nature of facial characteristics as a
biometric identifier, biometric data reveals historic and biographical
information depending on the application.38 Facial recognition algorithms
train on biometric data and identify unique facial patterns, akin to a facial
fingerprint, to create a “faceprint.”39
As facial recognition remains unregulated technology, corporations,
startups, and the government have developed facial recognition
algorithms trained on private and public images.40 Federal investigators
increasingly rely on facial recognition as a routine investigative tool, and
state law enforcement deploys the tool on low-level crimes like check33. Andrew Perrinn & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including
Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-includingfacebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/ [https://perma.cc/A65N-6PXR].
34. PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED, AND FEELING LACK
OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 3 (2019).
35. Lane Brown, There Will Be No Turning Back on Facial Recognition, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 12,
2019),https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/the-future-of-facial-recognition-in-america.html
[https://perma.cc/ND5K-AETH].
36. Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government Use: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (Jun. 4, 2019) (statement of Dr. Charles H. Romine,
Director of Information Laboratory, National Institute of Technology, Department of Commerce).
37. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 18
(Joseph N. Palto & Lynette L. Millett eds., 2010).
38. Id. at 111.
39. Abigail Tracy, Facebook Has Your Faceprint, Here's Why That Matters, FORBES (June 24,
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/06/24/facebook-has-your-faceprint-heres-whythat-matters/#2294241d18eb [https://perma.cc/RBH7-8NKW].
40. Brown, supra note 35.
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cashing fraud and petty theft.41 The FBI and twenty-one state agency
databases comprise a network of over 641 million photos from criminal
justice databases, driver’s license photos, and visa applications.42 Yet, that
massive image database and algorithms are limited due to the nature of
the images of individuals directly facing the camera.43 From 2013 to 2018,
the capability of facial recognition algorithms increased exponentially
according to the National Institute for Standards and Technology. 44
But the reliability of facial recognition tools is questionable. Despite
rapid technological improvements, vendors creating or executing this
technology must navigate changes in facial appearance caused by aging
and image quality.45 In one ACLU study, Amazon’s facial recognition
tool “Rekognition” erroneously matched twenty-eight members of
Congress to images from a 25,000 image mugshot database.46 Moreover,
studies reveal that racial and gender biases permeate facial recognition
technology: some commercial algorithms misclassify white women as
men at a nineteen percent error rate and women of color as men as often
as thirty-five percent of the time.47 Those error rates are especially
concerning in light of government use of social media posts; for example,
for surveillance of police brutality protests in Ferguson and Baltimore. 48
C. Automated and Systemic Surveillance
Clearview AI, an artificial intelligence company, incorporated facial
recognition, biometrics, and social media scraping to create a four billion
image facial recognition database.49 The company then commercialized
41. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are A Goldmine For Facial
Recognition Searches, WASH. POST, Jul. 8, 2019, at A08.
42. Facial Recognition Technology: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform,
116th Cong. (2019) (Statement of Gretta Goodwin, Director of Homeland Security and Justice).
43. Kashmir Hill, Face Scan App Inches Toward End of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2020, at
A1.
44. Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government Use: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (Jun. 4, 2019) (statement of Dr. Charles H. Romine,
Director of Information Laboratory, National Institute of Technology, Department of Commerce).
45. PATRICK GROTHER, ET. AL., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
ONGOING
FACE
RECOGNITION
VENDOR
TEST,
NISTIR
8238
7 (2019),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8238.pdf.
46. Jason Murdock, Amazon Face Recognition Tech Matches 28 Members of Congress with
Mugshots, NEWSWEEK (Jul. 27, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/amazons-face-recognition-toolmatches-28-members-congress-criminal-mugshots-1044850 [https://perma.cc/29GE-EPRR].
47. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 8 (2018).
48. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Social Media Sites Helped Police Track Minorities,
ACLU Says, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 12, 2016, at 16.
49. Tim Cushing, How Much Data Does Clearview Gather On People?, TECHDIRT (Mar. 27,
2020),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200324/17015544165/how-much-data-does-clearview-
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its database of images and the accompanying facial recognition algorithm
through contracts with federal, state, and local agencies, and private
citizens.50 Using scraped images, the facial recognition technology
develops a biometric template for each face based on the unique facial
geometry of each person.51 These user images were scraped in violation
of the terms of service of the respective platforms. 52 Search results on the
platform return all scraped photos connected to that biometric template
with links to sites.53 As such, the search results can reveal every piece of
information about a person that a person knowingly publishes, or what
others have published about them. As law enforcement officials deploy
Clearview’s algorithm in criminal investigations, the sensitive images are
incorporated into the dataset.54
This technology plays a larger role in law enforcement investigatory
practices. Until recently, major technology companies abstained from
combining these technologies over concerns of privacy and abuse.55 But
in early 2019, Indiana State Police searched a smartphone video of a
shooting in a public park against Clearview AI’s database and instantly
matched the shooter to social media images with links to Venmo,
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn profiles. 56 In 2020, thousands of law
enforcement departments use that or similar technology.57 In light of this
widespread use and the racial biases inherent in this technology, it is no
wonder that reports of wrongful arrests at the hands of facial recognition
have begun to surface.58
gather-people-answer-sadly-will-not-surprise-you.shtml [https://perma.cc/VS6P-5ZB6].
50. Ryan Mac, Carolina Haskins, & Logan McDonald, Clearview AI Once Told Cops to “Run
Wild” With its
Facial Recognition Tool, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-cops-run-wild-facial-recognition-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/C7WA-HJPP].
51. Jake Goldenfein, Australian Police are Using the Clearview AI Facial Recognition System
with No Accountability, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 3, 2020), http://theconversation.com/australianpolice-are-using-the-clearview-ai-facial-recognition-system-with-no-accountability-132667
[https://perma.cc/BK7M-25ZT].
52. Aaron Mak, Clearview’s Terrifying Facial Recognition Can’t Go Back in the Bottle, SLATE
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/02/youtube-linkedin-and-others-serve-clearview-aiwith-cease-and-desist-letters.html [https://perma.cc/U85Y-YYMK].
53. Hill, supra note 43.
54. Id.
55. Kashmir Hill, Twitter Tells Facial Recognition Trailblazer to Stop Using Site’s Photos, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/technology/clearview-ai-twitter-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/B5JM-ZK56].
56. Hill, supra note 43.
57. Ryan Mac, Carolina Haskins, & Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has
Been Used by The Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27,
2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/5R5Y-QF8C].
58. Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Led to Black Man’s Arrest. It was Wrong., N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2020, at A1.
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Illinois, Texas, and Washington regulated biometric data collection
through legislation prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Carpenter and reporting of Clearview AI’s capabilities. Illinois passed
the Biometric Information Privacy Act out of concern over the inherent
permanence of biometric features.59 The Illinois statute prohibits private
companies from collecting biometric information without user consent.60
Similarly, Washington requires notice and consent of the user before any
biometric data is collected for a commercial purpose. 61 Texas requires the
same.62 Federal law relies on the 1986 Stored Communications Act to
generally regulate electronic communication records.63 Under that law, a
federal court only needs to find facts showing a reasonable ground to
believe that the content of digital communications is relevant to a criminal
investigation.64
As facial recognition and biometric algorithms become more
sophisticated, and social media further ingrains itself into societal fabric,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has slowly recognized the privacy
implications of digital surveillance. The important focus on the principles
underlying Fourth Amendment protections implicates privacy concerns
related to emerging digital surveillance technology. The willingness of
the Supreme Court to incorporate modern technology into its
Constitutional doctrine has led to incongruous and winding results. Part
II explores those results.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and
seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” 65 American
jurisprudence delineates between searches and non-searches as a
gatekeeping function for that Constitutional right. This Part examines the
application of Fourth Amendment protections to surveillance technology
by the United States Supreme Court. First, this Part outlines the
limitations placed on Fourth Amendment protections when a person
knowingly exposes information to a third-party. Next, this Part surveys
59. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 / 5 (2018).
60. Matthew Kulger, Does It Hurt You if Your Face is Tracked by Technology?, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
28, 2018, at C18.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2019).
62. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503 (West 2019).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
65. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
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the line of Supreme Court cases that limit Fourth Amendment protections
when a person knowingly exposes a fact to the public. Finally, this Part
examines the evolution of Fourth Amendment privacy interests in the
digital age, culminating in a recent watershed opinion in United States v.
Carpenter.
In Katz v. United States, the Court explained Fourth Amendment
protections govern “people, not places.”66 Justice Harlan’s concurrence to
the majority opinion set forth two threshold requirements for Fourth
Amendment searches: first, whether an individual had a subjective
expectation of privacy; and second, whether there was a societal objective
expectation of privacy.67 In Katz, the Court concluded that stereophonic
tape recorders attached to a phone booth to eavesdrop on Charlie Katz’s
phone calls constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.68 That conclusion rested on the “vital role” of public
telephones within society and acknowledged the shifting societal norms
predicated on entrenched technology. 69 But Fourth Amendment
protections were considered inapplicable to information that a person
“knowingly exposes to the public.”70
A. Knowing Exposure to Third Parties
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a categorical exception
to Fourth Amendment protections when a person reveals information to
the public under the "third-party doctrine." According to the third-party
doctrine, American citizens have no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information willingly exposed.71 As a result, law enforcement agencies

66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In a prior decision, the Supreme Court
narrowed Fourth Amendment protections to “material things” based on the plain language of the
amendment and held police wiretapping outside was not a search within the Court’s understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things -- the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”).
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.”).
68. Id. at 353. One significant aspect of Katz is the Court's departure from its Fourth Amendment
surveillance precedent. Katz departed from the “eroded underpinnings” of Olmstead v. United States and
Goldman v. United States, Fourth Amendment cases controlled by the trespass doctrine.
69. Id.at 352.
70. Id. at 351. That same year, the Court struck down New York’s permissive eaves dropping
statute as a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Berger v. New York. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 44 (1967). In Berger, the Court recognized the fervor of the law enforcement community, which
considered telephone surveillance “the most important technique of law enforcement.” Id. at 60.
71. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone, petitioner
voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to
its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”).
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acquiring information known to an informant or held by a business is
considered “not a search” in the eyes of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.72 While this doctrine grew out of government use of
confidential informants, police technology has created an amorphous
doctrine with contradictory rulings. 73 According to Professor Richard
Uviller, the Court’s interpretation of privacy expectation hinges on the
degrees of awareness on the part of the surveilled and that the invisible
agent in Katz is wholly distinct from the “visible” undercover agent. 74
Similarly, the Court in Smith v. Maryland found no Fourth Amendment
search when police installed a pen register in a telephone company’s
central office to record the numbers dialed by defendant Michael Lee
Smith.75 Under the guise of the defendant “assuming the risk” of
information voluntarily turned over to third-parties and the “limited
capabilities” of the recording technology, the Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that Americans dial.76
Dissenters and legal scholars have questioned the underlying premise
and societal expectations promulgated under the third-party doctrine.77
Professor Sherry Colb questioned the “knowingly exposed” element of
the third-party doctrine when the government “deliberately manipulates

72. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
73. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (“On four occasions the conversations
took place in Jackson's home; each of these conversations was overheard by an agent concealed in a
kitchen closet with Jackson's consent and by a second agent outside the house using a radio receiver. Four
other conversations -- one in respondent's home, one in a restaurant, and two in Jackson's car -- were
overheard by the use of radio equipment.”).
74. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From The Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of
the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (1987) (“The law treats secret
surveillance of speech or other behavior largely according to whether the surveilling agent is visible or
invisible to the subject. An agent, visibly present though masquerading, is thought to gather evidence in
a fundamentally different manner than a concealed agent or a hidden electronic device. The theory is that
the contents of the mind, deliberately revealed to another person, are willingly shared, while the secret
eye or ear, possibly electronically enhanced, bypasses constitutional concern to spirit the evidence
away.”).
75. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (finding “no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not "legitimate." The installation and use of a pen
register, consequently, was not a "search," and no warrant was required.”).
76. Id. at 742 ("we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All
subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”).
77. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall disagreed on two
principles. First, inherent in participation in modern society is the practical necessity of modern
communication, that necessity forces members of society into the risk of disclosure. Second, Justice
Marshall framed the assumption of risk on what privacy expectation should be held in light of a “free and
open society” and cautioned that “unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become
a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.” Id.
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reality to create relationships for the sole purpose of betrayal."78 Some
scholars see the Court’s third-party doctrine as permitting government
intrusion into homes and lives through “a legion of spies,” while, at the
same time, decrying state agents who walk into our homes and rifle
through our drawers.79
B. Knowing Exposure to the Public
What a government agent observes in public is presumptively not a
search and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.80 The Court is
reluctant to force “law enforcement officers to shield their eyes” in
public.81 Because a person exposes information, that person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet again, technology forces the Court
to contort the boundaries of what is and is not a search of a person’s public
activities. Two cases illustrate the slight distinctions that lead to
incongruous Fourth Amendment protections: United States v. Knotts and
United States v. Karo.
In Knotts, police officers installed a beeper in a drum of chloroform
that they believed Leroy Knotts and Darryl Petschen would use to
manufacture amphetamines.82 Officers then tracked the beeper’s signal by
car and helicopter as Petschun drove the chloroform drum and beeper to
a cabin where, after obtaining a search warrant, police discovered an
amphetamine laboratory.83 The Court analyzed the surveillance by
removing the technology from the equation. First, the Court equated the
use of the beeper to police following a car on public streets and
highways.84 As a result, the Court found no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a person’s movements because that information is voluntarily
conveyed to “anyone who wanted to look.”85 Then, the Court
acknowledged the beeper but disregarded its role, reasoning that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from using sensory
augmented technology, finding support in a 1927 decision involving a
flashlight.86
One year later, in United States v. Karo, the Court ruled that police use
78. Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN L. REV 119, 141 (2003).
79. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 365
(1974).
80. See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
81. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
82. United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir.1981).
83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279 (1983).
84. Id. at 281.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 282 (quoting United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927)).
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of a beeper to monitor a suspect's movements through a home was
unconstitutional.87 In contrast to Knotts, the Court held the surveillance
violated the reasonable expectation of privacy and infringed on the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.88 The Court distinguished its
decision on grounds that the beeper was monitored within the house and
revealed “a critical fact about the interior of the premises.”89 The Court
honed in on the fact that the record in Knotts was unclear about whether
the beeper was monitored inside the cabin, whereas in Karo the police
conceded that they monitored the beeper in the interior of the home. 90
C. Adjudicating Privacy in the Digital Age: Kyllo, Jones, then
Carpenter
In a series of police-technology search cases, the Court acknowledged
the awkward fit between Fourth Amendment precedent and technology.
First, in Kyllo v. United States the Court considered the constitutionality
of government agents conducting warrantless thermal scans of homes
with a thermal imager.91 Thermal scans of the exterior of a suspect's
apartment detected heat emanating from halide lights to grow
marijuana.92 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded there
was no Fourth Amendment violation for two reasons: there was no
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from a home and
there was no objective expectation of privacy in the hot spots on the roof
and wall of the home.93
The Supreme Court disagreed that the thermal imaging was a noninvasive scan of the exterior of the house. 94 Instead, the Court's holding
was premised on the “sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development” that, if left unregulated, would hold citizens at the mercy
of advancing technology.95 Next, the Court refused to hinge a rule on
whether or not the surveillance would access “intimate” details due the
evolving nature of technology.96 But that same technology employed
within a suspect’s home mandated a bright and firm line, that technology
not in the public use implemented to reveal information about the home

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 709 (1984).
See id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 714.
Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
Id. at 30.
United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir.1999).
Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
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is a search that requires warrant.97
Then, in United States v. Jones the Court revisited the privacy
implications of Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices on a
suspect’s car. In Jones, police installed a device on the undercarriage of
Antoine Jones’ jeep, which resulted in 2,000 pages of data from four
weeks of surveillance.98 The Jones majority opinion returned to a
historical trespass analysis and held the physical installation of the device
was a trespass, and therefore, a Fourth Amendment violation.99
In the concurrences, a new understanding for Fourth Amendment rights
in the digital era emerged. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito noted
the impossibility of an eighteenth century analogue to the installation of
the GPS tracker and rebuked the reliance on eighteenth century tort law
to analyze twenty-first century Fourth Amendment issues.100 Instead, his
concurrence focused on long-term surveillance and the current landscape
of technologies that facilitate long-term surveillance.101 Furthermore,
technology has erased most, if not all, practical limitations on long-term
surveillance.102 While claiming the legislature as the proper body to
ensure the protections of privacy rights, he found a reasonable expectation
of privacy under Katz in long-term monitoring and cataloguing of public
movements.103
Justice Sotomayor also signaled the need for a new Fourth Amendment
doctrine in light of the emerging technological capabilities of the
government. In her concurring opinion, she noted that the questions
surrounding reasonable expectations of privacy hinge on whether citizens
reasonably expect the government to collect and store data that implicates
the private details of their lives.104 While GPS data was the central theme
of her concurrence, focusing on the collection of “aggregate data”
implicates the multitude of devices and technologies referenced in Justice

97. Id. at 40.
98. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
99. Id. at 405.
100. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring) (“is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted
himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements
of the coach’s owner?”).
101. Id. at 428 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring
is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of
the movements of motorists who choose to make use of that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car's location at any time so
that roadside assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen. Perhaps most
significant, cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the
location of users--and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were more than 322 million wireless
devices in use in the United States.”).
102. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 431 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Alito’s concurrence.105 Finally, Justice Sotomayor questioned the
propriety of the third-party doctrine in the digital age as “people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties” while carrying
out unremarkable tasks.106 While she concurred in the judgement, she
urged the Court to decouple privacy from secrecy, and cautioned that all
public actions should not forfeit an underlying privacy right.107
1. Carpenter v. United States: Privacy and Digital Monitoring of the
Whole of our Movements
The Court grappled with the very issues raised by the Jones
concurrences in Carpenter v. United States—specifically, long-term data
collection tracking a person’s every movement. 108 In Carpenter, police
accessed over 130 days’ worth of cell-site location information (CSLI)
data109 from Timothy Carpenter’s cell phone provider, equaling roughly
13,000 location points to track him. 110 Writing for the Majority, Justice
Roberts attempted to redefine the “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
the digital age without complete abandonment of Fourth Amendment
precedent. Adopting Justice Alito’s language of surreptitious monitoring
and Justice Sotomayor’s long-term data collection concerns in their
respective Jones concurrences, Justice Roberts concluded that the use of
historic CSLI data to track Carpenter violated the “reasonable expectation
[of privacy] in the whole of his physical movements.”111
Despite framing Carpenter as a narrow holding, the decision may have
broad implications. While the Court refused to explicitly overrule the
third-party doctrine of Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, the
Carpenter opinion disqualified that doctrine from the “novel
circumstances” of CSLI data, concluding that third-party disclosure does
not preclude Fourth Amendment protections.112 Given the widespread use
of cell phones in the United States and the “seismic shifts in digital
technology” that make detailed chronicles of a person’s physical presence

105. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.").
106. Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
108. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2019).
109. See id. (“Most modern devices, such as smart phones, tap into the wireless network several
times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features.
Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location
information (CSLI).”).
110. Id. at 2212.
111. Id. at 2219.
112. Id. at 2217.
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over the course of years, the Court reasoned that there was a “world of
difference” between CSLI data and the seemingly primitive technology
in Smith.113
2. Carpenter’s Aftermath
In the wake of Carpenter, several lower federal courts have extended
Fourth Amendment protections beyond historic CSLI data. 114 One district
court within the Tenth Circuit relied on Carpenter to find a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a generally public Facebook account. 115 The
court considered a warrant granting access to the entire Facebook profile
overbroad due to the pervasive nature of the data the account would
reveal. Finally, the court compared a search of the entire Facebook
account to a general warrant for rummaging through the entirety of a
person’s electronic belongings.116
Likewise, a Fourth Circuit district court extended the reasoning in
Carpenter to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-public
Facebook content.117 The court likened social media posts to sealed
packages and private calls entrusted to an intermediary to deliver the
information and found the third-party doctrine inapplicable.118 According
to the court, recognizing the manner in which technology enables the
government’s ability to encroach on private areas in our lives requires
protection of social media accounts due to the intimate, momentous, and
weighty information conveyed through those sites.119 However, even in
the aftermath of Carpenter, some lower courts dismiss the notion of any
reasonable expectation of privacy in social media posts.120
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit relied on Carpenter to determine whether
biometric data collection for facial recognition technology harmed social
media users’ privacy rights.121 Facebook’s facial recognition software
employs biometric face templates to identify users from the millions of
photos uploaded to Facebook for photo and location tagging.122 The court

113. Id. at 2219-20.
114. See generally United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (extending
Carpenter to GPS data that tracked the defendant’s movements over the course of a month).
115. United States v. Irving, 347 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621 (D. Kan. 2018).
116. Id. at 624.
117. United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 202 (W.D. N.C. 2019).
118. Id. at 203.
119. Id.
120. Ward v. City of Hobbs, 398 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1073 (N.M. 2019) (“regardless of what the
Supreme Court decides to do with social media on the internet, only the most ignorant or gullible think
that what they post on the internet is or remains private.”).
121. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 2019).
122. Id.
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concluded that biometric privacy rights are akin to the rights protected in
Carpenter due to the “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”
nature of the information revealed by facial recognition technology.123
The court considered future development and application of the
technology, cautioning against facial recognition scans of real-time
surveillance data and biometric templates being used to unlock password
protected phones through the facial recognition lock. 124
Similarly, a district court within the Ninth Circuit relied on Carpenter
to find that the use of biometric face scans of a suspect to access his smart
phone violated the Fifth Amendment.125 The court differentiated
biometric data from fingerprinting and DNA swabs because of the manner
of identification and access to a database of a person’s most intimate
information.126
Focusing on the nature of the data, some federal courts have shown a
willingness to extend Fourth Amendment protections to information that
is encyclopedic and intimate. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate the
looming issues in the aftermath of Carpenter. These cases also
demonstrate the degree to which courts are confronting policing
technology and the privacy implications implicit in Clearview AI’s
platform. With Carpenter as a guidepost courts will need to address the
tension between Fourth Amendment privacy expectations and access to
databases like Clearview AI’s.
III. EXTENDING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The preceding Parts of this Comment highlighted the questions and
challenges that courts will face regarding biometric privacy rights and the
Fourth Amendment in the wake of Carpenter. On one hand, Carpenter
cabined its holding as a narrow decision. 127 On the other hand, the lower
courts are already extending Carpenter to novel circumstances. In the
meantime, national attention has focused on the digital privacy rights
implicated by a multi-billion image database harvested from social media
sites that are practically inseparable from modern life.
Answering those questions requires an application of the guideposts set
forth in Carpenter. First, this Part applies state use of facial recognition
scans of biometric databases to the third-party doctrine as understood in
Carpenter. It then turns on the subjective expectation of privacy in a
person’s biometric data. Finally, this Part identifies an objective
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
See In re The Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
Id. at 1016.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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expectation of privacy in a person’s biometric data as currently used in
Clearview AI’s database.
The Article concludes by arguing that Fourth Amendment prohibition
on unreasonable searches should extend protection to an individual's
biometric data as a natural extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
as a matter of policy. Facial recognition scans of biometric data harvested
by third-parties, as a modern surveillance technology, renders the thirdparty doctrine anachronistic. Like CSLI data, facial recognition scans of
biometric data intrude into a sphere of privacy that merits protection
through the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.128
A. Unreasonable: The Third-Party Doctrine
As a threshold matter, the third-party doctrine is particularly
inappropriate in the context of facial recognition searches of biometric
data due to the nature of an individual’s biometric data. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence historically prohibits intrusions into the
human body.129 While the technology is predicated on the user images
uploaded to social media platforms and internet sites, the scan and map
of facial geometry is distinguishable from the user image itself. 130 The
user image itself becomes ancillary as the technology extracts the facial
features and formats them into a face print.131 Just as the thermal scan of
the house in Kyllo was not the same as officers on a public street observing
a home with the naked eye, facial recognition searches of biometric
databases are not naked-eye reviews of user photographs.132
Social media platforms predicated on user interactions and
connectivity developed the capacity to map the biometric data of user
images to enable user tags, suggest content, and target advertisements,
among other functions.133 Few could have imagined a society in which a
person's daily life and intimate relationships are indexed and searchable
in the matter of seconds in 2009, let alone in 1979 when Smith and Miller
articulated the third-party doctrine.134 But the unimaginable became
128. Id. at 2213.
129. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (“[With respect to searches
involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface[, t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the
Fourth Amendment protects forbid any intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained.”).
130. See infra pp. 5-6.
131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FBI FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, GAO-16267 6 n.14 (2016).
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
133. Joaquin Quinero Candela, Managing Your Identity on Facebook With Face Recognition
Technology, FACEBOOK (Dec. 19, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/12/managing-your-identity-onfacebook-with-face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/7G6M-R2FU].
134. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) ("After all, when Smith was
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reality due to the rise of social media and rapid developments in facial
recognition technology.135
What's more, voluntary exposure is inapplicable to biometric face
prints because, like the CSLI in Carpenter, that data is not truly "shared"
as the term is normally understood. 136 The biometric data used by
Clearview AI was never "voluntarily conveyed" to them in any sense—it
was web-scraped.137 Clearview AI’s situation is wholly distinct from
Miller, where a company voluntarily conveyed information to the
government.138 Rather, social media platforms and other websites scraped
by Clearview AI have actively sought to halt that practice. 139
As an increasingly indispensable aspect of participation in society,
social media and the internet are "pervasive and insistent part[s] of daily
life."140 While most Americans understand the pervasive nature of data
collection and commodification online, most feel they have little to no
control over their personal data. 141 Carpenter recognized that user data
increasingly stems from passive collection through the cell phone
applications.142 Moreover, individual users lack control over data stored
on other user accounts.143 Combined with web scraping, the permanence
of data creates a digital paper trail left behind for algorithms to follow.
As such, the same principles underlying the Carpenter decision
preclude application of the third-party doctrine to the biometric data upon
which facial recognition algorithms rely.

decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes,
conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the
person's movements.").
135. See infra pp. 4-6.
136. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2210.
137. See infra pp 3 –5.
138. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
139. Mak, supra note 52.
140. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2219 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 283 (2014).
141. Brook Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kamar, & Erica Turner,
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal
Information,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-andfeeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information [https://perma.cc/72RW-97VQ].
142. Kim Komando, You're Not Paranoid: Your Phone Really is Listening In, USA TODAY (Dec.
19, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2019/12/19/your-smartphone-mobile-devicemay-recording-everything-you-say/4403829002/ [https://perma.cc/8936-TCMK]; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
at 2220 ("Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails
and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather,
or social media updates.").
143. Nicole Karlis, You Just Deleted Facebook. Can You Trust Facebook to Delete Your Data?,
SALON (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/10/you-just-deleted-facebook-can-you-trustfacebook-to-delete-your-data/ [https://perma.cc/P46K-TGLR].

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/10

18

Doktor: Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment

570

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

B. Reasonable: Expectations of Biometric Privacy
The Fourth Amendment secures the right of the people to be “secure in
their persons.” This constrains unjustified bodily intrusions on the mere
chance evidence might be obtained. 144 And courts have long recognized
that the collection and analysis of biological samples is a search under the
Fourth Amendment.145 State use of biometric databases like Clearview
AI’s intrude beyond the skin to measure and map the human body based
on biological characteristics. 146 Fingerprinting and buccal swabs of
suspects have been upheld in the context of custodial booking procedures,
but in the context of a for-profit biometric database of web-scraped
images, the inherent government interest in booking procedures is
inapplicable.147
Nor does this technology fall within the category of searches that are
reasonable due to the “minimal intrusion.” Admittedly, biometric
mapping of a photograph is far less physically invasive than, for example,
compelled surgery; but a person’s individual dignitary interests in
personal privacy are nonetheless implicated. 148 Yet, the ease at which the
Clearview AI database was created implicates fundamental privacy and
security concerns, particularly because of the surreptitious nature of the
image collection and the absence of any mechanism to give or withdraw
consent.
Unlike fingerprinting, facial recognition searches of biometric
databases probe into the individual’s private life and thoughts.149 Within
seconds of uploading an image, the technology can identify a person,
reveal which social media accounts that person is on, and provide access
to a catalogue of images of that person along with links to web addresses
where they appeared.150 Given the intimate nature of social media use and
the ubiquity of social media in society, that catalogue can potentially
provide a pictorial timeline for the user. One Facebook user's data alone

144. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966).
145. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989).
146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FBI FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, GAO-16267 5 (2016).
147. See generally Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
148. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
149. United States v. Davis, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“[F]ingerprinting may constitute a much
less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions.
Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individuals private life and thoughts that marks an
interrogation or search.”); See also Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) citing Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (“[A]n invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s 'most personal
and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.'”).
150. Kashmir Hill, Before Clearview Became a Police Tool, It Was a Secret Plaything of the Rich,
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/technology/clearview-investors.html
[https://perma.cc/2J4M-8JFD].
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is the equivalent of 400,000 pages of Microsoft Word documents. 151 That
data can include a person’s historic location, social, political, and
biographical information. Even before Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit found
a reasonable expectation that emails would be shielded from outside
scrutiny because of the “sensitive and sometimes damning substance” of
emails, which implies an expectation that emails are private and not
public.152
This technology necessarily implicates broad privacy interests that
society has deemed reasonable. As the courts in the Ninth Circuit have
explained, a person’s biometric data is detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled.153 The capability of Clearview AI’s facial
recognition scans of a person's biometric data implicates a person's history
through the results of biometric queries. While the Supreme Court's
caution surrounded the privacy implications of CSLI data chronicling an
individual's physical movements, biometric data implicates intimate
details of a person's life beyond their physical location or the heat
radiating from their home.154 As a whole, government access to a database
of harvested images for the purposes of scanning the biometric faceprints
defies society’s expectation that law enforcement will not secretly
monitor and catalog an individual’s life.155
According to the Supreme Court, "the degree of community resentment
aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the
quality of intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security."156
In the very active and fervent debate surrounding Clearview AI’s
platform, multiple cities have banned the use of facial recognition and
state legislative initiatives regulate this type of technology. New Jersey
prohibited police use of the Clearview AI through the Attorney General’s
office.157 In response to public awareness and opposition to the
technology, some law enforcement agencies have banned its use
altogether.158 Cities like San Francisco, Oakland, and Somerville passed
151. Karlis, supra note 143.
152. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a subscriber
enjoys a reasonable expectation in the contents of emails stored, sent, or received through a commercial
internet service provider).
153. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 2019).
154. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
155. Carpenter,138 S.Ct. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (Alito, J.
concurring in judgment)).
156. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968).
157. Samantha Malamed, Police Tested Facial Recognition Program, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 6,
2020, at B1.
158. David Hernandez, San Diego Police, DA Ban Use of Facial Recognition App—But Not Before
it
was
Tested,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/story/2020-03-16/san-diego-police-das-
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ordinances in 2019 prohibiting the use of facial recognition and other
surveillance technologies.159 While those cities restrict the use of that
technology, other cities like Chicago use it without any oversight,
approval, or public input.160 Furthermore, New York City police have
defended the use of the technology as merely an investigative lead, but
less than probable cause.161 Other law enforcement officials acknowledge
the need to regulate the practice, but reject outright prohibition due to
public safety needs.162
On the federal side, two U.S. Senators probed Clearview AI over its
practices while the House of Representatives held hearings on the impact
of facial recognition technology on civil rights and liberties. 163 Those
hearings demonstrated strong bipartisan support for transparency and
accountability for the use of facial recognition technology in the U.S.164
Proponents of facial recognition technology defend its use as a research
tool to identify perpetrators and victims of crimes, and argue that police
should be able to use “every tool available” to find suspects and bring
them to justice.165 Yet even the most efficacious law enforcement
practices are subject to constitutional scrutiny—"the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table."166 While the United States Supreme Court has disfavored brightline rules, it has refused to leave reasonable expectations of privacy at the
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2019) (prohibiting any Somerville official from obtaining, retaining, accessing, or using any facial
recognition system or any information obtained from a facial recognition surveillance system).
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Use of Facial Recognition by Gulf States and International Markets, BUZZFEED (Mar. 4, 2020),
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mercy of advancing police technology that would allow police to discern
all human activity.167 In those cases, it has drawn firm and bright lines
that require a warrant for the use of particular surveillance methods.
Electronic privacy rights advocates urge a complete prohibition on the
technology.168 As it stands, there is not a single viable basis for monitoring
unconstitutional biometric searches of individuals through facial
recognition technology. As a matter of policy, concrete mechanisms
protecting the constitutional right to privacy must deter abuse of this
technology. At a minimum, before running a facial recognition search
against a biometric database like Clearview AI’s, law enforcement should
follow the basic the Fourth Amendment directive: get a warrant.
IV. CONCLUSION
This account of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shines a light on the
constitutional tensions surrounding police use of facial recognition
technology. The history illuminates the United States Supreme Court’s
tumultuous relationship with privacy rights in the surveillance age. The
sophistication of policing technology has far outpaced the reasoning of
the courts. As modern Fourth Amendment decisions illustrate, the Court
has recently shown a willingness to reconsider ill-fitting precedent in light
of modern surveillance technology. In the age of Carpenter, Fourth
Amendment protections should extend to an individual's biometric data.
But perhaps the clearest lesson is how unclear Fourth Amendment
protections are. The technology at the fingertips of Americans today, like
the constitutional amendments that the technology implicates, is
vexatious and intractable. There is no question that courts have tried to
balance legitimate policing needs with constitutional protections. While
the United States Supreme Court's decisions attempt to reflect the privacy
expectations of the nation, in an important sense, its decisions have
molded the expectations of law enforcement and civilians. The Court in
Carpenter may have conditioned its holding as a "narrow one" to avoid
disturbing both the past and the future. 169 But that decision did not make
the question of Fourth Amendment protections in the digital surveillance
era disappear. In fact, that question is now more urgent than ever. The
digital age, the universality of social media, the more than three billion
social media images scraped, the acceleration of facial recognition

167. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).
168. See Jennifer Lynch, Clearview AI-Yet Another Example of Why We Need a Ban on Law
Enforcement Use of Face Recognition Now, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (January 31, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/01/clearview-ai-yet-another-example-why-we-need-ban-lawenforcement-use-face [https://perma.cc/9EZP-G7TR].
169. Carpenter v. United States 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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technology, and the onset of digital surveillance companies have only
escalated the tensions of Fourth Amendment privacy expectations. If the
courts hesitate, the damage may be irreparable.
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